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INTRODUCTION
Before becoming a poster child for gender equity in athletics,
Heather Sue Mercer was an all-state place kicker at Yorktown Heights
High School in Yorktown Heights, New York (pop. 7,972).2 She en-
rolled at Duke University in the fall of 1994 and decided to become the
first woman ever to try out for the Duke football team. Initially she
failed to make the team as a walk-on, but the following spring she was
invited by the seniors on the team to play in the annual Blue-White
scrimmage) She ended up kicking a game-winning twenty-eight-yard
field goal . Afterwards, Duke head coach Fred Goldsmith and kicking
coach Fred Chatham both told her she was on the team, and she ap-
peared on The Tonight Show at the school's behest.' It became clear
before long, though, that Mercer would not be treated just like one of
the boys.
J.D. candidate, Yale Law School, June 2005. The author would like to thank William
Eskridge, Elora Mukherjee, Stanton Wheeler, and the editors of the Michigan Journal
of Gender 6- Law for helpful comments and suggestions.
I. See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 644 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, CENSUS 2000 SUMMARY FILE 1, available at http://
facfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTableds name=DEC-2000-SF1 U&gco-id=04000US
36&_boxhead_nbr=GCT-PH1 &format=ST-7 (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
3. Mercer, 190 F.3d at 644.
4. Mercer, 190 F.3d at 644-45.
5. Mercer, 190 F.3d at 644-45.
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6Goldsmith did not allow her to attend pre-season camp. He sug-
gested to her instead that she might participate in other extracurricular
activities, such as beauty pageants or cheerleading.7 She should, as Gold-
smith's daughter had done with baseball, "outgrow her interest."8 He
refused to issue her a uniform, banished her to sit in the stands "with
her boyfriend," and removed her, uniquely, from the team's "active ros-
ter. ' After a year in which Mercer was the only team member not
issued a uniform, she was officially told that there was no place for her
on the Duke football team.'0 Her dismissal made her another first: the
first member of the team Goldsmith ever had dismissed for ostensible
performance-based reasons." Mercer contacted an attorney the follow-
ing spring and subsequently filed suit against the university. 2
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that "[n]o
person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
.... ,,Duke is covered by Title IX. 4 A 1975 policy interpretation ex-
pressly extended the reach of Title IX to intercollegiate athletics. 5
Provided she could prove that her dismissal was because she was a
woman rather than because of her kicking skills, Mercer's case would
appear to be open and shut. It was not.
When the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
enacted its regulation applying Title IX to athletics, it specifically al-
lowed schools to deny members of the opposite sex the chance to try out
for single-sex teams for any reason or for no reason at all if the sport in-
volved was a contact sport." One court has called the "contact sport
exemption" "the broadest exception recognized to the overarching goal
of equal athletic opportunity.' 7 It enables any private school to deny
otherwise qualified athletes the opportunity to try out for its single-sex
teams in "boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball [or]
6. See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 181 F. Supp. 2d 525, 531-32 (M.D.N.C. 2001).
7. Mercer, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 531-32.
8. Mercer, 181 F. Supp. 2d ar 531-32.
9. Mercer, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 531-32.
10. Mercer, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 533-34.
11. Mercer, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
12. Mercer, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
14. See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 32 F. Supp. 2d 836, 838 n.4 (M.D.N.C. 1998).
15. See Athletics, 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 1(a) (2004); see also 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (June 21,
1975).
16. See Athletics, 34 C.F.R. 106.41(b). -
17. Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 1993).
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other sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily con-
tact,"' 8 solely on the basis of sex. It enabled Duke to argue, successfully
in district court, that it was entitled to treat Mercer as it wished.
Were Duke a public university, however, its behavior would clearly
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
19 The Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Virginia (VMI), which forced the
Virginia Military Institute to open its doors to women, made clear that
those who seek "to uphold government action based on sex" must satisfy
intermediate scrutiny by, inter alia, demonstrating an "'exceedingly per-
suasive justification' for classification."
2 "[O]verbroad generalizations
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and fe-
males" will not do.2' Even before VMI, only one published opinion
from an athletic discrimination case brought in federal court under the
Equal Protection Clause made any allowance for discrimination in try-
outs against qualified women on the basis of innate biological
differences.22
The disparity between what the Constitution permits of public
schools and what Title IX permits of private ones is thus unquestionably
stark. This Article calls this disparity into question. First, it asks under
what circumstances, if any, allowance for sex discrimination in athletics
may be justified under constitutional standards. Then, it considers the
practical relevance of the disparity between how a school may lawfully
discriminate under Title IX and how it may do so under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Finally, it offers a prescription for bringing into balance
the gender equity messages sent by Title IX and the Constitution.
Specifically, I begin with a brief history of Title IX and of the contact
sports exemption in an effort to determine why Congress and HEW so
limited the statute's coverage. In Part II, I discuss the requirements of the
Equal Protection Clause as applied to athletics and the reasons why the
contact sports exemption fails to satisfy heightened scrutiny. Part III deals
with the question-and it must be asked-of "Who cares?" Is whatever
injury the exemption may inflict worth fighting? Finally, I propose a way
in which a gender equity statute might satisfy the rigorous standards of
18. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2004).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1, cl. 2.
20. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) [hereinafter VMI] (quoting
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). See discussion infra
Part II.
21. VMI 518 U.S. at 533.
22. See Suzanne Sangree, Title IX and the Contact Sports Exemption: Gender Stereotypes in
a Civil Rights Statute, 32 CONN. L. REv. 381, 428 (2000) (discussing Lafler v. Ath-
letic Bd. of Control, 536 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Mich. 1982)).
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the Equal Protection Clause, a way in which the death of the contact
sports exemption need not mean the death of segregated athletics alto-
gether.
Historically, the strongest argument against applying a constitu-
tional standard to interscholastic athletics has been what might be called
the "symmetry" problem: The Equal Protection Clause is a two-way
street, and so skills-based arguments in favor of female participation in
male-only sports inevitably invite challenges to female-only sports as
well. I suggest that the skills gap, long used to justify exclusion of fe-
males, is the best argument in favor of a reasonable one-way ratchet that
allows women to participate in male-only sports without extending the
same opportunity to males who wish to participate in female-only
sports.
I do not argue here, as others ably have, for an "affirmative" theory
of Title IX.13 The Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence
through VMI has focused on what is known in feminist discourse as
"formal equality."24 Adherents to this view believe that, before the law,
"individuals who are alike should be treated alike, according to their
actual characteristics rather than assumptions made about them based
on stereotypes. 25 This Article contends, if the courts will not, that an
attack on the contact sports exemption and the separate sports provi-
sions of Title IX does not require an extension beyond formal equality
as it is presently understood 2 Indeed, the exemption is more anachro-
nistic than merely conservative, as it instantiates an abandoned
understanding of female interest and ability. Agencies are given the
flexibility to avoid this kind of calcified thinking.
23. See, e.g., Deborah Brake, The Struggle frr Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind
Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 13 (2001); Karen L. Tokarz, Separate but Un-
equal Educational Sports Programs: The Need for a New Theory of Equality, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 201 (1985).
24. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 27-28 (2d ed.
2003); Valorie Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally Male
Institutions, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 68, 71-72 (2002).
25. KATHARINE T. BARTLETT, ET AL. EDS., GENDER AND LAw: THEORY, DOCTRINE,
COMMENTARY 117 (3d ed. 2002).
26. But see Dana Robinson, A League of Their Own: Do Women Want Sex-Segregated
Spors?, 9 J. CONTEMp. LEGAL ISSUES 321, 350 (1998) (calling an asymmetrical model




I. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONTACT SPORTS EXEMPTION
Between 1970 and 1971, Bernice Sandier, the self-styled "Woman
Behind Tide IX,"27 filed more than 250 lawsuits against colleges and
universities, charging sex discrimination in hiring at a time when no
federal law restricted sex discrimination at private educational institu-
tions." Sandler's suits inspired Oregon Congresswoman Edith Green to
hold the initial hearings that eventually led to the enactment of Title IX
in 1972.29 Yet, according to one account, when Sandler asked Green
what lobbying she could do to help get Title IX enacted, Green replied
with, "'Nothing. Nobody knows what's in this bill. And if you start
making noise, they'll ask.' 0
Few involved in the passage of Title IX contemplated its reach.
Green's hearings were the only ones conducted; no official representa-
tives of higher education testified,3' and no committee reports were
generated.32 The statute's basic purpose-to ban sex discrimination in
all programs receiving federal funding-was understood. 3' Few inter-
ested parties seemed to worry about the details so long as quotas were
disclaimed, 4 which they were.35 The impact on athletic programs was
mentioned just twice in floor debates. In debates on an earlier version of
Tide IX, Colorado Senator Peter Dominick asked its Senate sponsor,
Birch Bayh of Indiana, whether the bill would reach "athletic facilities
or equipment."- Bayh's answer captured the thinking at the time: "I [do
not] feel it mandates the desegregation of football fields. What we are
trying to do is provide equal access .. . to the educational process and
the extracurricular activities in a school, where there is not a unique
facet such as football involved."37 Senator Dominick's response is in-
sightful: "If I may say so, I would have had much more fun playing
27. Bernice Sandier, at http://bernicesandler.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
28. JESSICA GAVORA, TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD: SCHOOL, SPORTS, SEX AND TITLE IX
21 (2002).
29. Id. Congresswoman Green wished to add "sex" to the protections of Title VI. See
Sangree, supra note 22, at 410.
30. GAVORA, supra note 28, at 22.
31. Id.
32. See Sangrec, supra note 22, at 410.
33. See id.
34. See GAVORA, supra note 28, at 22.
35. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2000).
36. 117 CONG. Rac. 30,407 (1971) (statement of Sen. Dominick).
37. Id. (statement of Sen. Bayh).
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college football if it had been integrated. ' 38 As Professor Suzanne San-
gree points out and as Senator Dominick's response shows, talk of
integrated football was a straw man, so little conceived of that its mere
mention obscured the statute's potential to reach other areas of intercol-
legiate athletics.39
Tide IX does not mention athletics, and its language is, depending
on one's perspective, either broad enough to include sports or narrow
enough to exclude them.4" The statute applies to "any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 4 1 Most athletic
programs do not receive direct federal financial assistance, but on the
other hand, all money is fungible. Thus the question of whether Tide
IX included athletics is a matter of statutory interpretation. While
HEW viewed Title IX as applicable to athletics, 42 the considerable am-
biguity as to its scope demanded further legislative action.
Leading the camp of those who would have athletics exempted
from the statute's coverage were the National Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation (NCAA) and Texas Senator John Tower, who twice introduced
an amendment to the law that would exempt "revenue-producing
sports., 43 According to the language of the proposed amendment, any
intercollegiate activity that "provide[s] gross receipts or donations to the
institution necessary to support that activity" would be exempt from
Title IX.44 The idea apparently was that revenue-producing sports such
as football and basketball do not rely on federal funding and thus should
not have to comply with Title IX.45 Even assuming it were true that bas-
ketball and football are self-supporting-and by and large they are
not46 the Tower Amendment limited itself neither to profit-making
38. Id. Bayh later said that the regulations would allow different treatment of female and
male athletes on the basis of sex only in unusual circumstances, such as when "sports
facilities or other instances where personal privacy must be preserved." 118 CONG.
REc. 5807 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
39. See Sangree, supra note 22, at 413 n.209.
40. See 20 U.S.C. 5 1681(a) (2000).
41. Id.
42. See Sangree, supra note 22, at 413 n.212.
43. See GAvoRA, supra note 28, at 60.
44. 120 CONG. Rc. 15,322 (1974).
45. See Sangree, supra note 22, at 414.
46. See Daniel L. Fulks, Revenues and Expenses of Divisions I and II Intercollegiate Athletics
Programs: Financial Trends and Relationships--1999 (2000), available at http://
www.ncaa.org/library/research/i_ii_rev_exp/2000. Seventy-eight percent of NCAA
football programs and seventy-three percent of NCAA basketball programs mn budget
deficits. Nat'l Coalition for Women & Girls in Educ., Title IX Athletics
Policies: Issues and Data fr Education Decision Makers 16 n.11 (2002),
available at http://www.womenssportsfoundation.orgbinary-data/WSFARTICLE/
pdffilc/914.pdf [hereinafter NCWGE]. Among Division IA schools, these numbers
[Vol. 11:133
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activities nor even to those that receive gate receipts. It was broad
enough on its face to encompass nearly all intercollegiate sports. The
House-Senate conference committee struck the Tower Amendment af-
ter it passed in the Senate.47
The Javits Amendment emerged in its place. Proposed by New
York Senator Jacob Javits, it required HEW to publish within thirty
days "proposed regulations implementing the provisions of Title IX...
which shall include with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities rea-
sonable provisions considering the nature of particular sports."48 HEW's
initial proposal in response to the Javits Amendment did not mention
contact sports. Specifically, it provided that:
athletic programs must be operated without discrimination on
the basis of sex. Such activities for which participation or selec-
tion is premised on factors other than skill may not be
conducted separately on the basis of sex. Athletics for which
selection is based on competitive skill may be provided
through separate teams for males and females to the extent
that such teams comply with the requirements of §§ 86.38 (b)
through (e)."Y
Subsections (b) through (d) provided, variously, that recipients of
federal monies were to make "affirmative efforts" to inform students of a
sex whose opportunities to participate in particular sports "have previ-
ously been limited" of the availability of equal opportunities, to provide
"support and training" to enable them to participate, and to provide
athletic opportunities in those sports.5" Subsection (e) disclaimed any
right to equal expenditures for athletics for members of each sex.5'
The final regulations published one year later were notably differ-
ent, containing the language that remains law today: "[A] recipient may
operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex where selec-
tion for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity
are much lower: thirty-six percent for football and twenty-nine percent for basketball.
Id.
47. S. 1539, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 535 (1974); see Christopher Paul Reuscher, Com-
ment, Giving the Bat Back to Casey: Suggestions to Reform Title IX's Inequitable
Application to Intercollegiate Athletics, 35 AKRON L. REv. 117, 124 (2001).
48. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484 (1974).
49. Education Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefiting From Federal Financial
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involved is a contact sport."" Whether the change resulted from politi-
cal compromise or a good faith effort to cabin Title IX within
"reasonable" limits remains difficult to discern, since HEW's official
explanatory notes do not address why the contact sports provision was
added."
The pre-regulation case law dealing with sex segregation in athletics
provides little guidance as to the impetus behind the regulation. It was
hardly a settled matter whether categorically excluding women from
contact sports could satisfy the heightened scrutiny traditionally af-
forded state-sponsored sex discrimination. In Clinton v. Nagy," a federal
district court in Ohio claimed to be applying only rational basis review
in refusing to dismiss a claim that a city of Cleveland regulation uncon-
stitutionally denied twelve-year-old Brenda Clinton the opportunity to
play football-a "contact sport""-solely based on sex. The court noted
that "there was no indication that defendants planned to assert ... that
Miss Clinton does not meet those standards required of the other mem-
bers of the [team], except for the fact that she is a female."56
In perhaps the most well-known case discussing sex discrimination
in sports prior to the 1975 regulations, the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit reversed a lower court ruling that the Darlington Little
League, which held games in the public parks of Pawtucket, Rhode Is-
land, could discriminate against girls.57 The court in Fortin v. Darlington
Little League, Inc. held that the district court's finding that "material
physical differences between boys and girls in the 8 to 12 age bracket
... could undoubtedly result in serious injuries to girls in said age
bracket who participated in a contact sport such as baseball"5 8 was not
supported in the record.59 Although the Fortin court limited its holding
to the eight-to-twelve age bracket, the case makes clear that a contact
sports exemption from Title IX seems premised on an understanding of
female physical limitations that was already contestable in 1975.
What is known is that the initial proposal in response to the Javits
Amendment garnered more than 9,700 public comments, ° the bulk of
which concerned intercollegiate athletics, and that the NCAA did more
52. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2004).
53. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128-45 (June 4, 1975).
54. 411 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
55. Id. at 1397.
56. Clinton, 411 F. Supp. at 1398.
57. See Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344 (ist Cir.' 1975).
58. Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 473, 479 (D.R.I. 1974).
59. Fortin, 514 F.2d at 349-50.
60. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (June 21, 1975).
[Vol. 11:133
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than its share of lobbying." As HEW Secretary Caspar Weinberger said
before Congress:
With regard to athletics ... [Il]et's look first at what the regula-
tion does not require because there seems to be substantial
misunderstanding about that .... It does not require women
to play football with men; ... it will not result in the dissolu-
tion of athletic programs for men; . .. and it does not mean
the [NCAA] will be dissolved and will have to fire all of its
highly vocal staff."
The staff of the NCAA was more than just highly vocal. In 1976, a
year after the new regulations went into effect, the NCAA filed a com-
plaint against HEW alleging, inter alia, that in applying Title IX to
intercollegiate athletics it had exceeded its authority under the statute."
While the suit eventually failed,6' it further demonstrated the organiza-
tion's desire to limit the reach of Tide IX as much as possible. Among
the comments filed after the initial rule proposal were several by other
athletic associations that complained about the impossibility of comply-
ing with the proposed rule's broader prohibitions on sex discrimination
in athletics.65
The concerns of the collegiate athletics establishment mirrored the
concerns of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the Mercer
case. Judge Luttig suggested in his opinion for the court that subsection
(a) of the 1975 Regulation, flatly forbidding sex discrimination in ath-
letics, would have "radically altered the face of intercollegiate athletics"
without additional qualifying language." Subsection (b) apparently
seeks to avoid this result by allowing schools to segregate their teams
when selection is based on competitive skill or when the sport is a con-
tact sport.67 When a school offers a sport for one sex but not the other,
members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try out only if athletic
opportunities for members of that sex have previously been limited or if
61. See Reuscher, supra note 47, at 124; Sangree, supra note 22, at 415.
62. Sangree, supra note 22, at 416.
63. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Califano, 444 F. Supp. 425 (D. Kan. 1978),
rev'd, 622 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1980).
64. Califano, 622 F.2d at 1382.
65. See Judith Lee Oliphant, Tite IX's Promise of Equality of Opportunity in Athletics: Does
It Cover the Bases?, 64 Ky. L.J. 432, 454 (1976); Comment, Implementing Title I:
The HEWRegulations, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 806, 833 (1976).
66. Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 646 (4th Cir. 1999).
67. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2004).
20051
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the sport is a non-contact sport.6" The first limitation-the competitive
skill provision-aims to prevent schools from having to eradicate all-
female teams. Without this proviso, schools would have to integrate any
non-contact sport involving competitive skill. It is difficult to think of a
sport that does not involve competitive skill, and it is difficult to imag-
ine a team that no male athletes would have sufficient skill to make. The
resultant death of all-female teams indeed would have radically altered
the face of intercollegiate athletics.6 ' The Mercer court did not, however,
elaborate on why the second limitation, the contact sports exemption,
was also required to prevent radical change. Nothing in the statute or
the Regulation, after all, forbids a school from discriminating on the
basis of skill, and it is ability, not sex discrimination, that remains far
and away the biggest obstacle to integrated athletics. That is, it is quite
easy to imagine an ostensibly integrated team that no female athletes
would have sufficient skill to make. Such as they were, any fears of
women getting tackled by three hundred-pound linemen or dunked
upon by seven-foot centers were greatly exaggerated. The competitive
skill provision goes a long way-no shorter than necessary, at least-
towards avoiding this result.
If the NCAA feared any change at all, then its fears were well-
grounded. Title IX's reach is beyond the scope of this Article, but let it
suffice here to say that it is nothing short of revolutionary. From the
1971-72 academic year to 2000-01, the number of collegiate varsity
female athletes increased by 411% (compared to 36% for male athletes),
and the number of high school female varsity athletes increased 847%
(compared to 6.9% for males). 70 From 1981-82 to 1998-99, the num-
ber of female college teams rose 66%, compared to .4% for male
teams." These gains notwithstanding, the contact sports exemption has
become an anomaly, among the last remnants of official de jure sex dis-
crimination.
72
The language of the provision limiting it to "contact sports" belies
its breadth. The HEW Regulation itself specifies basketball as a contact
sport-perhaps, and one can only speculate, a nod to Senator Tower
68. Id.
69. See Yellow Springs Exempted Viii. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High Sch. Ath-
letic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding the regulations regarding
separate teams constitutional to prevent "male dominance of all teams").
70. NCWGE, supra note 46, at 6 tbl.3.
71. Id. at 10 tbl.6.
72. Others include military combat and public bathrooms, two of the areas that helped
to defeat the Equal Rights Amendment. See, e.g., Serena Mayeri, Constitutional




and the NCAA7-and courts have used its extension to "other sports
the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact ' 74 to po-
tentially exempt the likes of field hockey and baseball." In holding that
whether field hockey was a contact sport was a matter of fact and not
law, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit relied on the testimony
of a college field hockey coach who testified that running up and down
the field "inevitably produce[s] and involves bodily contact," even
though such contact violates the rules.76 If a sport in which bodily con-
tact will incidentally occur but is nonetheless prohibited may constitute
a contact sport for the purposes of Title IX, then the term "contact
sport" loses its practical significance in any team setting. A qualified girl
excluded from just about any all-male team sport at a private school may
77
be without legal recourse.
The one check in place on overt discrimination is the third prong
of the 1975 Regulation, requiring funding recipients to "provide equal
athletic opportunity for members of both sexes. 78 This provision has
been interpreted by both HEW and the courts as limiting the discrimi-
nation permitted under the contact sports exemption to situations in
which equal opportunity has otherwise been provided. 7' As I will discuss
in Part III, the presence of the equal opportunity provision bears little
on whether the contact sports exemption undermines gender equity. If
anything, the equal opportunity provision effects an administrative chia-
roscuro, providing evidence that even HEW knew that separate was not
altogether equal.
73. See Sangree, supra note 22, at 397.
74. 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 1(b) (2004).
75. See Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding
whether field hockey was a contact sport to be a disputed issue of fact); cf Carnes v.
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (holding
it questionable whether baseball was a contact sport under a high school athletic asso-
ciation's rules).
76. Williams, 998 F.2d at 172.
77. To be sure, the same is true of a qualified boy. For a discussion of why this may be
justified even independent of the "athletic opportunities" language of the 1975 Regu-
lations, see infra Part II.
78. 34 C.F.R § 106 .4 1(c) (2004).
79. See, e.g., Yellow Springs Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651, 655-56 (6th Cir. 1981); Thomas A. Cox, Intercolle-
giareAthleics and Title IX, 46 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 34, 45 (1977).
2005]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
II. THE REQUISITES OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Barely forty years have passed since the Supreme Court upheld a
Florida statute that automatically exempted women, but not men, from
jury service.80 Effectively applying a rational basis test, the Court con-
cluded that because a "woman is still regarded as the center of home and
family life," Florida's sex-based classification was constitutional.8" The
modern Equal Protection Clause is a bit more searching. As developed
through Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,8' which compelled a
public, all-female nursing school to admit men, and VMI more re-
cently, 83 the doctrine requires that a state actor wishing to classify on the
basis of sex demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for
doing so.84 These and similar cases employ the language of so-called in-
termediate scrutiny, requiring a state to justify sex-based discrimination
with "important governmental objectives" and means "substantially re-
lated" to those objectives.8 5
While purportedly applying the same test as Hogan, VMI is notable
because it elevates "exceedingly persuasive justification" from a descrip-
tion of the Hogan test into a separate, parallel test. 6 The distinction is
not trivial. Chief Justice Rehnquist decried the shift as introducing too
much uncertainty into the test.8 7 It may be more apt to say that the
word "exceedingly" makes the test easier, not harder, for judges to ap-
ply, but more difficult for defendants to meet. While one person's
"persuasive" is indeed another's "unpersuasive," one is reluctant to de-
clare anything "exceedingly" so. The traditional contours of
intermediate scrutiny permit reasonable disagreement as to the defer-
ence due the state actor;88 the VMI test makes clear that no deference is
due whatsoever. The state unquestionably bears a heavy burden.
80. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
81. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 62. The Supreme Court did not uphold an Equal Protection chal-
lenge alleging unconstitutional gender-based discrimination until Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971). See VMI, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
82. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
83. VMJ, 518 U.S. 515.
84. VMI, 518 U.S. at 524; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
85. VM, 518 U.S. at 524; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976).
86. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
87. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
88. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding a Florida statute that gave
widows but nor widowers a property tax exemption).
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VMI attempted to justify its exclusion of women on two grounds.
89
First, single-sex education contributed to "diversity in educational ap-
proaches."" Second, the school would have to alter its "adversative
approach" in order to accommodate women.
9" The Court rejected the
first rationale as either disingenuous or ill-served by the school's exclu-
sionary policy. 2 Justice Ginsburg noted that not only had the state of
Virginia shown little commitment to educational diversity in its hun-
dreds of years of male-only education," but also that such diversity was
not served by conferring a unique educational benefit 
on one sex alone. 
4
As for the second rationale, the fact that "[s]ome women ... would
want to attend the school if they had the opportunity,
'" ' and that "some
women can meet the physical standards ... imposed on men"'
6 under-
mined any argument that the school's adversarial approach required
substantive alteration. Said Justice Ginsburg for the Court,
"[G]eneralizations about 'the way women are,' estimates of what is ap-
propriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to
women whose talent and capacity places them outside the average de-
scription.0
Public schools attempting to exclude qualified women and girls
from contact sports solely because of sex have generally met a fate simi-
lar to VMI's. 98 Most federal courts, particularly in recent years, have
held that justifications offered by schools and athletic associations failed
even the deferential intermediate scrutiny of Hogan.
99 As the HEW
89. VMI, 518 U.S. at 534-35.
90. VMI, 518 U.S. at 535.
91. VMI, 518 U.S. at 535.
92. VMI, 518 U.S. at 540.
93. VMI, 518 U.S. at 535-37.
94. VMI, 518 U.S. at 539-40.
95. VMI, 518 U.S. at 523.
96. VMI, 518 U.S. at 525.
97. VMI, 518 U.S. at 550.
98. Courts have, on the other hand, accepted providing equal opportunity to women and
redressing past discrimination as acceptable justifications for the exclusion of boys
from girls sports. See, e.g., Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th
Cir. 1982) (volleyball); Kleczek v. R-I. Interscholastic League, 768 F. Supp. 951
(D.R.I. 1991) (field hockey).
99. See, e.g., Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496 (D. Kan. 1996) (high school wrestling);
Lantz v. Ambach, 620 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (high school football); Leffel v.
Wisc. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wisc. 1978) (high
school baseball, inter alia); Hoover v. Meildejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977)
(high school soccer); cf Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.
1973) (various non-contact sports). But see O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist.
23, 449 U.S. 1301 (1980) (allowing sex discrimination in junior high school
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Regulations themselves furnish no official justification for the contact
sports exemption, institutions facing challenges to exclusions of women
from contact sports have had to submit their own rationales to judicial
scrutiny. In Adams v. Baker, in which a female sought a preliminary in-
junction compelling her high school wrestling team to grant her a
tryout, the judge dismissed a typical panoply of official justifications in
typical fashion. '° The school offered several reasons for its sex-based
exclusion: safety, fear of sexual harassment, disruption of the school set-
ting, moral objections, and "inconveniences" ranging from having to
employ different coaching techniques to providing different locker room
facilities."' I consider each of these reasons in turn.
The Adams court agreed that student safety is an important gov-
ernmental objective but concluded, "The defendants' only evidence that
plaintiffs safety is at greater risk because of her gender is based on gen-
eralized assumptions about the differences between males and females
regarding physical strength." 10 2 Since "the evidence shows that some fe-
males are stronger than some males ... [t]he school can take into
account differences of size, strength, and experience without assuming
those qualities based on gender.' '0 3 In short, using sex as a proxy for
propensity towards injury is both over- and underinclusive: unusually
robust girls are prohibited from sports that particularly fragile boys are
allowed to play.
Courts considering claims in this area are fond of noting that be-
tween-sex physical differences are smaller than within-sex differences;
that is, the difference between the weakest boy and the strongest boy is
greater than the difference between the average boy and the average
girl.' °4 This disposes of little. Even if between-sex differences were
greater than within-sex differences, it is not clear that excluding an oth-
erwise qualified female based on sex would pass muster under the Equal
Protection Clause. Indeed, it may strengthen the case of women's advo-
cates to concede that, on average, between-sex differences in propensity
towards injury as well as in strength and skill are anything but trivial.
Depending on the sport and the study, women are anywhere from two
to eight times more likely than men to tear the anterior cruciate liga-
basketball); Lafler v. Athletic Bd. of Control, 536 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Mich. 1982)
(allowing sex discrimination in amateur boxing).
100. 919 F. Supp. 1496.
101. Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1504.
102. Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1504.
103. Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1504.
104. See, e.g., Yellow Springs Exempted Viii. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651, 656 (6th Cir. 1981); Hoover, 430 F. Supp. at 169.
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ment of one of their knees.10 5 The precise cause of this disparity remains
unknown, though research has suggested reasons ranging from differ-
ences in balance, hormonal profile, knee joint laxity, muscular strength
and fatigue, and neuromuscular activation.
1 6 Female athletes also tend
to have lower bone mass than their male counterparts and are thus more
susceptible to fractures. 
1
7
Anthropologist David Geary, who studies sex-related developmen-
tal differences, has found large and intractable differences between boys
and girls in a host of areas related to athletic performance.
08 During
puberty, boys develop larger hearts, skeletal muscles, and lungs than
girls, a greater capacity for carrying oxygen, and a greater ability to neu-
tralize "the chemical products of muscular exercise.
" 1°' By age seventeen,
three out of four boys have better visual acuity, throwing accuracy, and
ability to block thrown objects than the average girl.
1 Before puberty,
boys have better grip strength, run faster, and jump higher.
"1 ' More than
nine out of ten boys between the ages of two and four outperform the
average girl in throwing distance, and more than nine out of ten boys
between the ages of four and seven outperform their female peers in
throwing speed, even though girls of that age are more physically mature
than boys; by age twelve, the two distributions are almost entirely sepa-
112
rate.
These findings are hardly indisputable. The plaintiffs challenging
the Darlington Little League in the Fortin case
" ' introduced evidence
from a pediatrician who testified that girls in the eight to twelve age
105. See Edward M. Wojtys, et al., The Effect of the Menstrual Cycle on Anterior Cruciate
Ligament Injuries in Women as Determined by Hormone Levels, 30 AM. J. SPORTS
MED. 182, 182 (2002).
106. See id.; Susan L. Rozzi, et al., Knee Joint Laxity and Neuromuscular Characteristics of
Male and Female Soccer and Basketball Players, 27 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 312, 312
(1999); Laura J. Huston & Edward M. Wojtys, Neuromuscular Performance Charac-
teristics in Elite Female Athletes, 24 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 427 (1996); see also AM.
MED. ASS'N, COMPLETE GUIDE TO WOMEN'S HEALTH 90-91 (Ramona I. Slupik ed.,
1996) (discussing differences in estrogen levels between athletic and non-athletic fe-
males).
107. See Lavienja A.J.L.M. Braam, et al., Factors Affecting Bone Loss in Female Endurance
Athletes, 31 AM. J. SPORTS MaD. 889, 889 (2003) (quoting J. M. TANNER, FETUS
INTO MAN: PHYSICAL GROWTH FROM CONCEPTION TO MATURITY 74 (1990)).
108. See DAVID C. GEARY, MALE, FEMALE 209 (1998).
109. Id. at 213.
110. Id. at 214.
111. Id. By age seventeen, nine out of ten boys outperform the average girl in these aras.
Id.
112. Id. at 213-1
4 .
113. See discussion supra Part I.
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bracket are "generally larger and as strong or stronger than boys of a
similar age, . . . are no more subject to fractures or other injuries, no
more unstable on their feet, are neurologically similar, and have the
same amount of fat."' 4 Moreover, to whatever extent large physical dif-
ferences do exist between boys and girls, at least some of these
differences result from socialization: The average seventeen-year-old boy
has blocked more thrown objects than his female peer." 5 As noted by
Dr. Crane, the defendants' medical expert in Fortin, it is "the normal
activity of a young lady to keep off baseball fields and play with dolls.... "6 That Dr. Crane's statement is appallingly patronizing does not
diminish the point that part of the observed difference between the
physical skills of boys and girls comes from practice. For example, while
acknowledging certain innate differences in muscle size, height, and fat
distribution, biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling has suggested that the hor-
monal differences essential to height and strength may depend in part
on exercise."'
Of course, if group differences are at all important to the Equal
Protection inquiry-and one must assume for the sake of the "safety"
argument that they are-then the particular reason for the sex-linked
difference is of little consequence. To one who believes large average
differences in size, strength, and skill justify use of a sex proxy, that
those differences were caused by socialization is, standing alone, no ar-
gument. There is no a priori reason why an individual female is more
likely to be a "social" outlier than a "genetic" outlier, whether or not it is
so empirically.
More apposite but perhaps less convincing than the socialization
argument is the one advanced by Professor Sangree, among others, that
there is a danger even among the most careful of scientists to produce,
inadvertently or not, results that justify pre-conceived notions."8 Says
Sangree:
The notion that physical contact and unfettered play is inap-
propriate for fragile females is one deeply ingrained in our
culture.... Whereas in the nineteenth century medical sci-
ence viewed women as the fainting and hysteria prone,
114. Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 349 (1st Cir. 1975).
115. Geary's hypothesis is that these differences result from sexual selection. See GEARY,
supra note 108, at 214-15.
116. Fortin, 514 F.2d at 350.
117. See ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES ABOUT
WOMEN AND MEN 215-16 (1989).
118. See Sangree, supra note 22, at 404-10.
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"physiologically inferior sex," contemporary questions about
female athletic participation dwell upon females' assertedly
weak knees, distorted pelvic structure, inadequate muscle
mass, and the damaging effect of strenuous exercise upon
menstruation and childbearing. These concerns look suspi-
ciously like the same old wolf dressed in modern sheep's
clothing.'19
Whatever the credibility of studies purporting to demonstrate the
physical weakness of girls relative to boys, one of the take-home lessons
of VMI is that it does not especially matter: Whether or not girls gener-
ally are more injury-prone does not answer the Equal Protection
inquiry. The Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that it views
Equal Protection guarantees as addressing individuals, 
not groups.
According to Doug Reese, the head wrestling coach at the University of
Minnesota at Morris, "Once you have had the opportunity to see a well
conditioned female athlete with technical skills you will be sold [on
women's wrestling]." 2 ' The test for a violation of the Equal Protection
clause is whether a qualified woman is denied opportunity; so long as
the "But what about me?" question lingers, average differences are ir-
relevant. The state bears the concededly heavy burden of showing that
the excluded woman is herself unqualified, physically unfit, or more
susceptible to injury than her male counterparts, and may not bar her
on the basis of sex alone.
22
One might respond by arguing that propensity toward injury may
be immeasurable and unseen, and so reliance on statistical probability is
permissible. But schools by and large are unable to shoulder the burden
of proving that similar concerns animate their treatment of potentially
injury-prone boys. The Adams court noted evidence of injury to male
119. Id. at 409-10. The late anthropologist Stephen Jay Gould has suggested a similar
mechanism at play with respect to perceived racial differences. Gould, who discred-
ited the nineteenth-century "science" of craniometry by redoing the skull-size
experiments of the leading scientists of the day, believed that preconceived notions
about racial differences in intelligence inadvertently biased their experimental
method. See generally STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (2d ed.
1996).
120. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
121. Doug Reese, Womens Wrestling, at http://www.wresdegirl.com/barnl.htm (last vis-
ited Dec. 5, 2004).
122. See Clinton v. Nagy, 411 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (granting a temporary
restraining order to compel a municipal football league to allow a twelve-year-old girl
to be on a team where the league did not present evidence that the girl herself was
unfit).
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wrestlers and declared it "certainly improper to subject boys to greater
danger than girls. ,123 In Hoover v. Meiklejohn,124 in which a federal court
held unconstitutional a Colorado High School Athletic Association rule
limiting soccer to males, the court rejected an injury prevention ration-
ale in part because it was paternalistic. The court said, "[T]o the extent
that governmental concern for the health and safety of anyone who
knowingly and voluntarily exposes.. . herself to possible injury can ever
be an acceptable area of intrusion on individual liberty, there is no ra-
tionality in limiting this patronizing protection to females . 1...,,125 The
parents of girls and girls themselves have at least as great an interest in
their physical well-being as do schools. Of course, a state's interest in
public safety often overcomes the protestations of those being protected;
seatbelt laws are one obvious example. The difference is that exercises of
a state's police power are not typically subject to heightened scrutiny. It
is difficult for a state to argue that the margin of its interest in public
safety is so high above the interest of the athlete herself in making deci-
sions about her athletic involvement and tolerance for potential injury as
to constitute an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for a policy of per
se discrimination.
The Adams court disposed of the other proffered justifications for
female exclusion with still greater alacrity. Avoiding sexual harassment
claims, while an important interest, said the court, is best served by
taking measures to directly prevent such harassment, not by denying
athletic opportunities to women. 126 The court further did not consider
moral objections of parents and various administrative inconveniences
to be important state interests, noting that even if they were, "these
problems could be overcome with minimal effort.' ', 27 As to the potential
for disruption of the school setting, the Adams court refused to assume
any important governmental interest was at stake where no evidence had
been introduced to that effect.'28 To allow rationales such as moral
123. Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1504 (D. Kan. 1996); see Force v. Pierce City
R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1029 (W.D. Mo. 1983) ("[Tihe 'safety' factor
which defendants would utilize to prevent any female from playing eighth grade
football-including those who could play safely-is not applied to males at all, even
to those who could not play safely."). Recent research has suggested potentially
greater incidence of intra-articular injuries among male as opposed to female athletes.
See Dana P. Piasecki, et al., Intraarticular Injuries Associated With Anterior Cruciate
Ligament Tear: Findings at Ligament Reconstruction in High School and Recreational
Athletes: An Analysis of Sex-Based Differences, 31 Am. J. SPORTS MED. 601 (2003).
124. 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977).
125. Hoover, 430 F. Supp. at 169.
126. Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1504 (D. Kan. 1996).
127. Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1504.
128. SeeAdams, 919 F. Supp. at 1504.
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objections, disruption, and fear of sexual harassment claims to succeed
would be to sanction the sex discrimination analog of a heckler's veto,
long disfavored under another species of heightened scrutiny-that
employed in First Amendment jurisprudence.
129
At bottom, the Adams court and courts considering similar claims
seem concerned not with whether legitimate interests might be ad-
vanced by excluding women from contact sports, but rather with
whether excluding women from contact sports is either sufficient or
necessary to effectuate that interest. To return to the subtle distinction
between "exceedingly persuasive justification" being a description of the
heightened scrutiny test and it being the test itself, Justice Scalia may be
quite right in saying that the effect is to convert the "substantial rela-
tion" test into a "narrow tailoring" test. 30 Given that Adams relied on
Hogan and was decided before VMI, it may be fair to say that in at least
a few corners of the federal judiciary, the conversion had already been
made.
The one rationale for excluding girls from playing sports with boys
that has gained any currency with federal judges is the symmetry di-
lemma: If courts do not allow sex segregation in sports, so it goes, they
cannot uphold a regulation that prevents boys from playing, and
thereby eliminating, girls' sports. " ' Although Justice Stevens sat in the
majority in VMI, while sitting as a circuit justice sixteen years earlier he
relied on Title IX in denying a preliminary injunction to a public high
school girl who was barred from trying out for the boys' basketball
team. 3 2 "Without a gender-based classification," Justice Stevens wrote
in O'Connor v. Board of Education of School District 23, "there would be a
substantial risk that boys would dominate the girls' programs and deny
them an equal opportunity to compete."'
33 This argument would seem to
provide the rationale for the HEW Regulations' other allowance for dis-
crimination in tryouts: Schools may deny interested and able students a
tryout on the basis of sex if the sport involved is a contact sport or "ath-
letic opportunities for members of that [included sex] have previously
129. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35
(1992) ("Speech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or
banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.").
130. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 570-71 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. 23, 449 U.S. 1301 (1980); Carnes
v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
132. O'Connor, 449 U.S. 1301.
133. 449 U.S. at 1307.
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been limited."13 The crutch of historical discrimination is something of
a sine qua non of Title IX, considered necessary to prevent the obviously
unintended result of effectively eradicating women's teams by allowing
men to try out.
The idea that broad past "societal" discrimination can justify spe-
cific present discrimination in the "opposite" direction has been rejected
as logically sloppy in the race context because it is both over- and under-
inclusive."' A race-based affirmative action program premised on
"societal discrimination" inevitably fails to capture those who are not
members of the preferred minority group but nonetheless face system-
atic disadvantage-such as Asian Americans or poor whites-and
includes some perceived to have faced lesser hurdles, namely wealthier
African Americans. 36 The Supreme Court has generally required a gov-
ernment actor defending an affirmative action program on the grounds
of prior discrimination to bear the heavy burden of demonstrating that
the institution has itself discriminated.
3 7
While this evidentiary burden would seem to be less of an obstacle
for schools wishing to offer preferential treatment to female athletes
than for a city wishing to offer a minority set-aside in a particular indus-
try (virtually every coed school in the country can show past intentional
discrimination against women in its sports programs), there remains a
troubling element of both overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness in
using this justification for "reverse" discrimination in the context of sex-
segregated athletics and other activities. Past discrimination is underin-
clusive because it allows a school to exclude men from a sport that they
do not threaten to dominate physically. A public school that sponsored
134. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2004); see Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 646 (4th
Cir. 1999).
135. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1989). The Court's
opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), does nothing to upset this
holding.
136. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 339-40 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) ("Or, alternatively, the Court could attempt to assess how grievously each group
has suffered from discrimination, and allocate proportions accordingly; if that were
the standard the current ... policy would almost surely fall, for there is no Western
State which can claim that it has always treated Japanese and Chinese in a fair and
evenhanded manner.... Nor obviously will the problem be solved if next year the
Law School included only Japanese and Chinese, for then Norwegians and Swedes,
Poles and Italians, Puerto Ricans and Hungarians, and all other groups which form
this diverse Nation would have just complaints."). But see Deborah C. Malamud, Di-
versity of Opinions: Affirmative Action, Diversity and the Black Middle Class, 68 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 939 (1997) (arguing that the black middle class faces greater economic
hurdles than initial appearances might suggest).
137. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 498.
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a female-only chess team would, I contend, be immune from challenge
under Title IX 3' but susceptible to challenge under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Past discrimination is overinclusive because it invites legal
challenges against a school that excludes men from a sport, such as field
hockey, volleyball, or gymnastics, that they might well dominate be-
cause of their sex but for which their opportunities have not been
limited.
Indeed, the strained relationship between field hockey, the contact
sports exemption, and the historical discrimination exemption has been
the impetus of numerous Title IX and state and federal constitutional
challenges. 3 In Williams v. School District of Bethlehem, a challenge to
the girls-only field hockey program at Liberty High School in Bethle-
hem, Pennsylvania, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
the language of the policy interpretation relating to limited opportuni-
ties was school-wide rather than sport-specific."4 ° That is, for the
plaintiff to prevail, he would have to show that the school's athletic of-
ferings as a whole were weighted against boys, not simply that boys were
being denied the opportunity to play field hockey.'4' Although the Wil-
liams court dodged the constitutional question, " ' justifying
discrimination against men in a specific sport on the basis of a general
limitation on female athletic participation in the past employs the same
tortured reasoning rejected in race-based affirmative action cases.143
138. See 34 C.F.R. 5 106.3(b) (2004) ("In the absence of a finding of discrimination on
the basis of sex in an education program or activity, a recipient may take affirmative
action to overcome the effects of conditions which resulted in limited participation
therein by persons of a particular sex.").
139. See, e.g., Williams v. Sch. Dist. Of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993); Kleczek
v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951 (D.R.I. 1991); see also Rick
Reilly, Not Your Average Skirt Chaser, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 26, 2001, at 100
(discussing co-ed field hockey in western Massachusetts).
140. 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993).
141. See Williams, 998 F.2d at 174.
142. See Williams, 998 F.2d at 176; see also discussion infra Part III (discussing whether
avoiding the constitutional question was proper).
143. See Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1982)
("[W]hile a lack of overall equality of athletic opportunity certainly raises its own
problems, the presence of such equality cannot by itself justify specific inequality of
opportunity in any given sport."); Petrie v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855,
860 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979) ("The [lower] court reasoned that if a State governmental
unit had a volleyball team limited to girls but none upon which boys might play,
when boys had actually had less volleyball playing opportunities than girls, even
though boys had had more general athletic opportunity, a violation of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause might occur.").
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Alas, neither Title IX nor the Constitution requires that the con-
cept of historical discrimination avoid the unseemly result of men
running roughshod over women's athletic programs. One could instead
justify asymmetry in the application of the Equal Protection Clause to
sex distinctions in athletics by reference to the very demonstrated
physiological differences upon which many women's advocates would
rather not dwell. The concern over males dominating females in sports
attaches only to those males who would not dominate but for their sex.
It is simply not possible to conduct an individualized inquiry, the
equivalent of a tryout, into the extent to which a particular male's skills
would be diminished but for his sex. Given the size of average sex-linked
physical differences between males and females, it is therefore perfectly
reasonable to presumptively exclude a male from a female sport, at least
after puberty. On the other hand, these same average differences in per-
formance-related physical skills make entirely unreasonable a
presumption that sex is motivating any advantages a female may demon-
strate.
This relatively straightforward rationale for asymmetry, though
rarely invoked, has not gone entirely unnoticed by courts. In Petrie v.
Illinois High SchoolAssociation,' " the Illinois Court of Appeals rejected a
sixteen-year-old's challenge under the state and federal constitutions to
his high school volleyball team's exclusion of boys. Even under the strict
scrutiny required by the Illinois Constitution, the court upheld an as-
sumption that sex-based physical differences could justify an application
of the Equal Protection Clause that was not sex-neutral:
The classification of public high school athletic teams upon
the basis of gender in sports such as volleyball is itself based on
the innate physical differences between the sexes. It is not
based on generalizations that are "archaic," nor does it repre-
sent an attitude of "romantic paternalism." Like all systems of
classifications for competition, it is overbroad and underbroad
in that it includes females who are athletically superior to
many males and excludes males who are less well-endowed
athletically than most females. However, we are convinced that
it is the only feasible classification to promote the legitimate
and substantial state interest of providing for interscholastic
athletic opportunity for girls. 145
144. See Petrie, 394 N.E.2d at 864-65; see aho Clark, 695 F.2d at 1126.
145. Petrie, 394 N.E.2d at 862 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 11:133
HANDS OFF POLICY
The court concluded that other means of screening boys and girls
for skill were impractical.' While, as I have noted, the evidence of sex-
linked physical differences is in some dispute, the only evidence that a
reviewing court would require to uphold "reverse" discrimination in
athletics is a substantial likelihood of a non-de minimis average dispar-
ity. A boy playing with girls carries with him such a strong presumption
that, but for his sex, he would be less skilled that the use of sex as a
proxy for excess skill is permissible. Such fairness considerations do not
come into play for girls participating in boys' sports, since any "excess"
skill is presumptively just that, and not a sex-based advantage.
One potential objection to any assertion that a presumption of un-
fair sex-linked advantage may satisfy heightened scrutiny is courts'
traditional concern over irrebuttable presumptions. The Supreme Court
held in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Murry that the Department
could not declare a household presumptively ineligible for food stamps
solely based on their having declared dependents on their previous two
years' tax returns.147 Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas called the
determination "an irrebuttable presumption often contrary to 
fact,"'14 1
and thus a violation of due process. Might it be argued, in accordance
with the Murry line of cases, that an agency determination that male
athletes are using sex to their advantage is unconstitutionally rigid? The
answer is an unqualified no. First of all, the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine seems to have vanished from the Supreme Court's administra-
tive law jurisprudence."' Secondly, the test for when a statutory
classification qualifies as overbroad coincides nicely with the test for
when an asserted state interest is sufficiently tailored to survive height-
ened scrutiny. 5 ° If I am correct in arguing that a court applying the
Equal Protection Clause could exclude males from trying out for female
teams based on their physical attributes, then the irrebuttable presump-
tion doctrine poses no obstacle.
146. See Petrie, 394 N.E.2d at 862. Other means included segregation by height, weight,
or age.
147. 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973).
148. Murry, 413 U.S. at 514; accord Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974) (overturning school board rules requiring disability leave for teachers after the
fourth month of pregnancy); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (invalidating a
Georgia law providing for automatic drivers' license suspension of uninsured motor-
ists who were involved in auto accidents, prior to a liability determination).
149. See Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA
L. REv. 447, 514 (1989) (calling the irrebuttable presumption doctrine "moribund").
150. See JERRY L. MAS-AW, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 133 (5th ed. 2003).
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III. DOES THE CONTACT SPORTS EXEMPTION MATTER?
In June of 2002, the Department of Education created a commis-
sion of professional athletes and educators to make recommendations
for reforming Title IX.' In the much-ballyhooed report the commis-
sion issued in February 2003, it made twenty-three recommendations to
Secretary of Education Rod Paige.'1 Not one mentioned the contact
sports exemption.' Neither was it mentioned in a minority report is-
sued by dissatisfied commission members.'54 The exemption has
received relatively little popular attention, even from gender equity ad-
vocates.' There are reasons for this apparent apathy, even beyond a
lingering, perhaps latent, disconnect between athletic scrums and tradi-
tional notions of femininity,' 56 and even beyond any decisions to pick
one's battles.
For one, Title IX's implementing regulations are anything but si-
lent on the question of providing athletic opportunity to female athletes.
In 1979, HEW issued an additional regulation to "provide institutions
of higher education with additional guidance on the requirements for
compliance with Title IX in intercollegiate athletic programs." 57 The
1979 Interpretation established, among other things, Title IX's now-
notorious "proportionality test." In brief, under one of three tests for
compliance, recipients of federal funding must demonstrate that athletic
participation opportunities for members of each sex "are provided in
numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments."'58
151. See U.S. Dep't of Education, Secretary's Commission on Opportunity in Athletics, at
http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/athletics/index.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2004).
152. THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION'S COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS,
OPEN TO ALL: TITLE IX AT THIRTY 33-40 (2003), available at http://www.ed.gov/
pubs/tideixat30/title9-report.pdf [hereinafter OPEN TO ALL].
153. See id
154. See DONNA DE VARONA & JULIE FOUDY, MINORITY VIEWS ON THE REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS (2003), available at http://
www.savetitleix.com/minorityreport.pdf.
155. In a comprehensive sixty-six page report on Title IX produced in August 2002 by
two leading female athlete advocacy groups, the contact sports exemption is never
mentioned. See NCWGE, supra note 46.
156. See SHIRLEY CASTELNUOVO & SHARON R. GUTHRIE, FEMINISM AND THE FEMALE
BoDY 92 (1998) ("The [feminist) essentialists' dismissal of sports requiring the direct
use of one's body to overcome an opponent is based on the belief that the limitations
of the female body make it unsuitable for physical contact.").
157. Policy Interpretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413
(proposed Dec. 11, 1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86).
158. Id. at 71,418.
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The other two tests are a bit more nebulous. The second requires an
institution to "show a history and continuing practice of program ex-
pansion which is demonstrably responsive to developing interest and
abilities of the members" of an historically excluded sex.159 The third
asks an institution to show that "the interests and abilities of the mem-
bers of that sex have been fully and effectively accommodated .... 
160
Because their amorphous contours invite increased litigation, these sec-
ond two tests are less emphasized. 6 ' Schools typically defend against
Title IX lawsuits by showing a measure of substantial proportionality.162
Thus, institutions looking for ways to comply with Title IX want noth-
ing more than a groundswell of skilled female athletes to count towards
that proportionality.
This statutory incentive to provide women's teams, combined with
the simple fact that very few female athletes have either the physique or
the skill to compete with male athletes at a high level of competition,
sharply narrows the number of people aggrieved by the contact sports
exemption. Moreover, as I have discussed, athletic programs run by
public entities are beholden to the Equal Protection Clause. Since col-
lege-aged female athletes are far less likely than younger ones to qualify
to compete with male athletes in contact sports, the women most in-
jured by the contact sports exemption seem to be high school-aged or
younger girls attending private schools that choose to exclude them
from sports for which they have sufficient skill to compete with boys. 1
63
It is a distinct minority, to say the least.
Whatever harm the contact sports exemption effects, it may run
deeper than outward appearances suggest. First, Title IX's dizzying com-
plex of regulations may in some cases act to pre-empt constitutional
claims. Equal Protection relief is sought under section 1983, which pro-
vides a remedy for violations of civil rights by those acting under color of
state law. 164 But under Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See OPEN TO ALL, supra note 152, at 23.
162. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993).
163. Private athletic programs were briefly exempted from Title IX after the Supreme
Court held in 1984 that the specific program in question, not the school generally,
must directly receive federal funding to be covered by the statute. See Grove City
Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573 (1984). University athletics do not typically receive
direct federal assistance. See id. at 601 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Congress responded
by passing the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, which restored the Title IX
analysis to an institution-wide approach. See Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 3(a), 102 Star.
28, 28-29 (1988) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2000)).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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Sea Clammers Association,'65 Congress may constructively preclude reli-
ance on section 1983 by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme
within the ostensibly right-granting statute.'6 Title IX does provide for
administrative enforcement. Not only does an aggrieved party have a
right under the statute to file a complaint with the Department of Edu-
cation, but the Department itself has the power to conduct compliance
reviews sua sponte. Moreover the Supreme Court decided in Cannon
v. University of Chicago that there is an implied private right of action
under Title IX itself.'8 The federal circuits are split on Title IX's preclu-
sive effect on section 1983 actions. While the Second, Third, and
Seventh Circuits have held that constitutional claims are subsumed
within Title IX,' the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held the
opposite. 7 ° While never addressing the issue directly, the Supreme
Court has implied that there are at least some cases in which Title IX
does not automatically preclude section 1983 claims.'
7'
Of course, an athlete who alleges that she has been discriminated
against unconstitutionally, but who does not allege a violation of Title
IX, states a different claim than one who alleges conduct that violates
both the Constitution and the statute. It strains common sense to sug-
gest that a claim based on a constitutional violation that is not also a
violation of Title IX should be barred by Sea Clammers. To apply the
Sea Clammers doctrine to an Equal Protection claim that Title IX is
simply unable to recognize would be to eviscerate a constitutional right
by statute. As the Supreme Court noted in Hogan, "Although we give
deference to congressional decisions and classifications, neither Congress
nor a State can validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 72 Yet Justice Stevens refused to give more
than lip service to this judicial canon in his O'Connor opinion. In hold-
ing that reliance on Title IX was highly persuasive in deciding the
165. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
166. Id. at 20.
167. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7 (2004).
168. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
169. See Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 758 (2d Cir. 1998);
Waid v. Merrill Area Publ. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 862-63 (7th Cir. 1996); Pfeiffer v.
Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1990).
170. See Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir. 1997); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d
1226 (10th Cir. 1996); Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cit.
1996). For similar opinions in federal district courts, see Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at
Chapel Hill, 240 F. Supp. 2d 492 (M.D.N.C. 2002); Carroll K. v. Fayette County
Bd. of Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 618 (S.D. W.Va. 1998); Alston v. Va. High Sch.
League, 176 F.R.D. 220 (W.D. Va- 1997).
171. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
172. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732-33 (1982).
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constitutional issue of whether a girl could be barred from trying out for
a contact sport, he wrote, "Although [Title IX] compliance does not
confer immunity on ... defendants, it does indicate a strong probability
that the gender-based classification can be adequately justified." 7 ' Al-
though rejected repeatedly by lower courts,1 74 this line of reasoning in
support of the contact sports exemption has never been repudiated by
the Supreme Court.1 75 In the Williams case, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit used Sea Clammers to avoid an Equal Protection inquiry
into whether a public high school could discriminate against boys field
hockey players even though one of the plaintiffs claims was that boys
had been the victims of past discrimination.17 ' As discussed in Part II, it
is far from clear that the Title IX standard for when remedial discrimi-
nation is permissible coincides with the constitutional standard.
Whether or not O'Connor and Williams got it right, there is sufficient
murkiness in this area for differences between Title IX and the Equal
Protection Clause to be abundantly relevant to public school athletes.
The effect of the contact sports exemption on older athletes also
may be greater than appearances suggest. In March 2003, the Florida
High School Activities Association approved girls flag football as an offi-
cial sport,177 with teams fielded by ninety-two schools across the state.
17
1
Stan Goldstein, the head flag football coach at Lawton Chiles High
School in Tallahassee explains the sport's beginnings:
The evolution of this sport began three years ago ... as an ex-
perimental sport, stemming from the ever controversial Title
IX issue of providing equitable opportunities for females in
high school sports. It was another avenue of opportunity for
girls to proudly represent their school(s), while participating in
an activity that has proven to be very popular amongst the
173. O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. 23, 449 U.S. 1301, 1307-08 (1980).
174. See cases cited supra note 99.
175. Compare O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. 23, 645 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cit.
1981), with Barnett v. Texas Wrestling Ass'n, 16 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695 (N.D. Tex.
1998) ("The lack of a Title IX violation ... does not mean that the defendants' ac-
tions were in all respects lawful.").
176. Williams v. Sch. Dist., 998 F.2d 168, 176 (3d Cit. 1993).
177. See News Release, Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Clearwater High To Host First-Ever
Flag Football Finals (Feb. 24, 2003), at http://www.ffisaa.org/news/2003/03022 4 .asp.
178. See Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 2003 Flag Football District Assignments, at
http://www.flisaa.org/programs/classes/2002_O3/ffg.asp (last updated Feb. 24, 2003).
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girls whose only experience with football was the annual
17)"Powder Puff" tournament.... 
Chiles had 102 girls try out for the team in 2003; it now offers
both varsity and junior varsity teams and has a girls flag football booster
club."' The Chiles experience illustrates not that football is a particu-
larly popular sport among girls-it is not 8 1-but that "interest and
ability," the talismanic touchstones of Title IX compliance, are not
wholly exogenous; both may be created from within. The 1975 and
1979 Policy Interpretations expressly address Title IX as working to-
wards "effectively accomodat[ing] the interests and abilities of members
of both sexes., 18 2 To that end, the second and third prongs of the pro-
portionality test refer, respectively, to developing and to accommodating
the interests and abilities of an historically excluded sex (read:
women)." s3 The contact sports exemption, even if it directly affects only
younger athletes, eventually affects the interest and abilities of older
ones. The fewer their opportunities to play contact sports at a young
age, when gender-linked differences are less profound, the less women
will have either the interest or the ability to play such sports at an older
age. If fewer women have the interest and ability to play contact sports
at the college level, the impetus to create college teams will be dimin-
ished, and the number of women who will play in college and
professionally will be smaller. The fewer women who play contact sports
in college and professionally, the fewer the number of young girls who
will be inspired to try out for their grade school teams. And so the cycle
continues. Assuming that there is some benefit to participating in con-
tact sports, the exemption may do its greatest damage in future
generations.
Whatever benefit there is to athletic participation in fact furnishes a
further reason why the exemption matters. Limitations on contact
179. Stan Goldstein, Football: It's Not Just a Man's Sport Anymore (2003) (online editorial,
on file with author).
180. Id.
181. Only Florida offered girls' high school flag football in 2003. See NAT'L FED'N OF
STATE HIGH SCH. ASS'NS, 2002-03 PARTICIPATION SURVEY 12 (2003), available at
http://www.nfhs.org/Participation/2003/2002-03-Participation.pdf. In the 2002-03
academic year, 1,477 high school girls in thirty-three states played eleven-person
football, twenty-six played six-player, and thirty-nine played eight-player. Id. Thus
fewer girls played high school football in the entire country than boys played in the
state of Vermont alone. See id. at 2. The relative popularity of women's rugby at the
collegiate and club level may suggest, however, that girls don't play football only be-
cause they are not expected to do so.
182. Athletics, 34 C.F. R § 106.41(c)(1) (2004).
183. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
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sports limit the number of teams in which women can be involved, and
therefore limit the number of girls involved in athletics. According to
research commissioned by the President's Council on Physical Fitness
and Sport, the regular exercise that sport provides for young women
may reduce obesity, make them less susceptible to certain cancers, en-
hance mental health, reduce stress and depression, and increase
academic achievement." 4 Other studies have suggested a negative corre-
lation between female athletic participation and indices of eating
disorders and other unhealthy neuroses."' Research by the Tucker Cen-
ter for Research on Girls & Women in Sport even suggests that female
athletes become particularly skilled drivers.186 There is more broadly, it
is commonly believed, a certain "physical and psychological empower-
ment that comes from being skillful in the use of the body."
' 7 Those
who play sports learn to work as part of a team and to excel in a com-
petitive environment, which is assumed to transfer into success in the
job market later in life. As Judge Lambros observed thirty years ago in
Clinton v. Nagy, "Organized contact sports have generally been thought
of as an opportunity and means for a young boy to develop strength of
character, leadership qualities and to provide competitive situations
through which he will better learn to cope with the demands of the fu-
ture."'18  These claims, particularly as they concern the psycho-social
rather than the physical effects of sport, are not wholly undisputed."
9
184. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON PHYSICAL FITNESS & SPORT, PHYSICAL ACTIVITY &
SPORT IN THE LIVES OF GIRLS: PHYSICAL & MENTAL HEALTH DIMENSIONS FROM AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 14-15 (1997), available at http://www.fitness.gov/
girlssports.pdf !hereinafter COUNCIL].
185. See Patricia Marten DiBartolo & Carey Shaffer, A Comparison of Female College Ath-
letes and Nonathletes: Eating Disorder Symptomatology and Psychological Well-Being, 24
J. SPORT & EXERCISE PSYCHOL. 33, 38 (2002); Janet A. Wilkins, et al., A Comparison
of Male and Female University Athletes and Nonathletes on Eating Disorder Indices: Are
Athletes Protected?, 14 J. SPORT BEHAV. 129, 139 (1991).
186. See MARY Jo KANE & KIM D. PEARCE, TUCKER CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON GiRLs &
WOMEN IN SPORT, INVESTIGATING DIFFERENCES IN DRIVER ACCIDENT INVOLVEMENT:
THE INFLUENCE OF PERCEPTUAL MOTOR COMPETENCE, COMPETTIWE ATHLETICS, AND
GENDER (1999), available at http://www.its.umn.edu/pdf/cts9903.pdf.
187. CASTELNUOVO & GUTHRIE, supra note 156, at 108.
188. 411 F. Supp. 1396, 1399-1400 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
189. See, e.g., Donna J. Kuga & Gaylene Douctre, Athletic Participation and Self-Image:
Are Male and Female Athletes Reaping Similar Benefits?, 51 PHYs. EDUCATOR 194
(1994) (comparing conflicting literature on the effect of athletic participation on
"personal social-psychological characteristics"). It is worth noting that the anti-sports
lobby is not particularly strong, and so much of the research in this area is commis-
sioned by those with an interest in encouraging sports participation. The President's
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Some research, for example, has suggested that both male and female
athletes may be more likely to have "maladaptive" behavior tendencies
such as gambling addictions, alcoholism, and drug abuse,19 and that
participation in high- and medium-contact sports may negatively affect
athletes' moral functioning. 9'
Even if those who herald the benefits of sport were to rely solely on
supposition and common assumptions, one might ask if it is particularly
relevant whether the benefits of contact sports are "real" or not. In VMI,
Justice Ginsburg quotes the school's mission statement early in the
opinion-"to produce educated and honorable men, prepared for the
varied work of civil life, imbued with love of learning, confident in the
functions and attitudes of leadership, possessing a high sense of public
" 192service. . . . -to persuade readers that certain public rents should not
be restricted to only one sex.' Whether with good reason or not,
sports-and "contact sports" like football and basketball in particular-
have been exalted to a similar position of civic importance. As sociolo-
gist Michael Messner notes, "[T]he armored male bodies of football
players are elevated to mythical status ...."194 The gladiatorial, heroic
image of the contact-sport athlete resonates enough that there is, I sug-
gest, a harm in being told that it is out of reach solely because of one's
sex.
More than a decade ago, Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi coined
what is known in the voting rights world as "expressive harm."' 95 It is,
simply, a harm "that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed
through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or
material consequences the action brings about."'96 While Pildes and
Niemi used the concept to refer to the constitutional injury at issue in
Council, for example, admits a bias in favor of promoting fitness. See COUNCIL, supra
note 184, at 13.
190. See Stephen M. Weiss, A Comparison of Maadaptive Behaviors ofAthleres and Nonath-
letes, 133 J. PSYCHOL. 315 (1999).
191. See Maria Kavussanu & Nikos Ntoumanis, Participation in Sport and Moral Function-
ing: Does Ego Orientation Mediate Their Relationship?, 25 J. SPORT & EXERCISE
PSYCHOL. 501, 514 (2003). Earlier studies in this area have found that "athletes who
have participated extensively in medium or high contact sports display aggressive ten-
dencies, judgments that injurious acts are legitimate, or low levels of moral
reasoning." Id.
192. VM, 518 U.S. 515, 521 (1996).
193. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 557.
194. Michael A. Messner, Sports and Male Domination: The Female Athlete as Contested
Ideological Terrain, 5 Soc. SPORTJ. 197, 202 (1988).
195. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts, "and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH.
L. REv. 483, 485 (1993).
196. Id. at 506-07.
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Shaw v. Reno,"7 which condemned race-conscious districting, I find it
equally applicable where the remedial scheme Congress establishes to
promote gender equality creates a safe haven from which females may
remain excluded. As Professor Deborah Hellman has noted, the idea
that the "social meaning" of state action-the message it conveys to the
citizenry-is as important as its substantive effects has jurisprudential
roots in Brown v. Board of Education."s The constitutional sin of school
segregation was not merely that it led in practice to inferior educational
outcomes for black schoolchildren, but that, in the words of Charles
Black, "the social meaning of segregation is the putting of the Negro in
a position of walled-off inferiority . . . . 199 Similarly, to insist upon sex
segregation whose obvious purpose is to keep "men's sports" for men
and "women's sports" for women offends regardless of whether schools
can claim broadly, as Title IX's implementing regulations demand, "to
provide equal opportunity in the selection of sports and levels of compe-
tition available to members of both sexes. 2 00 The injury dealt to
Heather Mercer and to those with similar stories to tell is real, both as a
blow to them personally and as an expressive harm to actual and poten-
211
tial female athletes everywhere.
IV. BRINGING THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONTACT
SPORTS EXEMPTION INTO BALANCE
The contact sports exemption is not for courts to trifle with, which
is not to say that it is not unconstitutional. If the Equal Protection
Clause forbids public institutions from denying opportunities to women
solely because they are women, then a congressional regulation that ex-
pressly provides for such discrimination should perhaps be struck down
197. 509 U.S. 630 (1993); see Pildes & Nicmi, supra note 195, at 507.
198. See Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L.
REv. 1, 2-3 (2000).
199. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
427 (1959).
200. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,417 (1979).
201. See Brake, supra note 23, at 142-43; CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UN-
MODIFIED: DiscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW 121 (1987) ("For women, when we have
engaged in sport, when we have been physical, it has meant claiming and possessing a
physicality that is our own .... In other words, athletics can give us our bodies as a
form of being rather than as a form of appearance, or death-likeness."); see generally
PRECILLA CHOI, FEMININITY AND THE PHYsIcALLY AcTIvE WOMAN (2000) (discuss-
ing cultural barriers to female participation in sport).
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202on direct challenge. Congress probably could not, one imagines, pass a
law conditioning federal funding on non-discrimination but exempting
discrimination against blacks from Mississippi. But the issue of institu-
tional competence, cemented by Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,"' is difficult to overcome. In the language of the
now familiar formulation, an agency's constructions of a statute it ad-
ministers "are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute, provided congres-
sional intent is not clear with respect to a particular issue. As Title IX
itself did not originally mention athletics, congressional intent was any-
thing but clear. Through the Javits Amendment, Congress expressly left
to HEW the task of striking a balance between the mandates of equality
and the unique challenges athletics programs present to those man-
dates. 0 5
Courts considering the question have tended to assume without
much argument that the contact sports exemption is a reasonable regu-
lation. In Kelly v. Board of Trustees,216 for example, an unsuccessful
challenge to the elimination of the men's swimming team at the Univer-
sity of Illinois, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declared the
regulation containing the contact sports exemption to be "not at odds
with the purpose of Title IX,,,207 and therefore deserving of Chevron def-
erence. The court added in a footnote that "Congress would indeed be
surprised to learn that Title IX mandated co-ed football teams."2 °8 Barri-
ers to women's participation in contact sports were not the ones at
which Congress was taking aim. In Yellow Springs Exempted Village
School District Board of Education v. Ohio High School Athletics Associa-
tion, °9 a successful challenge to the state of Ohio's rule forbidding
schools from offering sex-integrated contact sports, the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit overruled a lower court ruling that the contact
sports exemption was unconstitutional. The court held that because the
regulation gives schools the discretion of providing equal athletic oppor-
tunities either by integrating their contact sports teams or through other
means and does not outright forbid integrated teams, it passes constitu-
202. See Sangree, supra note 22, at 388.
203. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
204. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
205. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1993) ("The degree of deference is
particularly high in Title IX cases because Congress explicitly delegated to the agency
the task of prescribing standards for athletic programs under Title IX.").
206. 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cit. 1994).
207. Id. at 270.
208. Kelly, 35 F.3d at 270 n.5.
209. 647 F.2d651 (6th Cit. 1981).
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tional muster"1 This distinction is akin to distinguishing between a
regulation that requires discrimination against blacks from Mississippi
and one that merely allows it en route to compliance with an overall
non-discrimination mandate. The same institutions whose histories of
discriminatory behavior inspired Title IX are given the discretion to de-
cide precisely how to discriminate. With this level of judicial latitude,
lawsuits are not the answer to the contact sports exemption.
As such, it is incumbent upon the Department of Education or,
failing that, upon Congress, to update Title IX's understanding of ath-
letic equality to approximate, at least, that of the federal courts. I do not
aspire, as Professor B. Glenn George hypothesizes in evaluating various
proposals for confronting sex segregation conundrum, to "forget the
legal parameters for a moment" and design "a perfect sports world in
equality terms... n My goal is far more modest: to bring Title IX into
twenty-first century jurisprudence.
One commentator has said that "although the overall team-
structure requirements [of the 1975 regulation] might appear to en-
compass neutral standards that disregard distinctions between sexes, in
fact they result in continued discrimination."
2 2 This, I contend, is not
sex-neutrality as we presently understand it. The VMI Court would not
allow the state of Virginia to remedy its discrimination against women
by leaving VMI's exclusionary admissions policy in place and establish-
ing the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL), which the
Court called "different in kind from VMI and unequal in tangible and
intangible facilities. , 213 VWIL, Justice Ginsburg protested, "'deempha-
size[s]' military education and uses a 'cooperative method' of education"
rather than "the rigorous military training for 
which VMI is famed.,
214
What if, instead of creating an emasculated sister institution and
maintaining segregated admissions tracks, Virginia had created a parallel
sister school and opened the admissions policies of both VMI and the
new school to members of both sexes? Further, what if the adversative
model of both schools were truly identical to that of VMI? All indica-
tions are that the VMI Court would have struck down this remedy as
insufficiently attentive to the differences between men and women.
210. See Yellow Springs Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High Sch. Ath-
letic Ass'n, 647 F.2d at 656.
211. B. Glenn George, Fity/Fifity: Ending Sex Segregation in School Sports, 63 OHIo ST. L.J.
1107, 1142 (2002).
212. Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics: Putting Some Muscle on Title JX,
88 YALE L.J. 1254, 1270 (1979).
213. VMI, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996).
214. VMI, 518 U.S. at 548 (citations omitted).
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Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that "[a]dmitting women to VMI would
undoubtedly require alterations necessary to afford members of each sex
privacy from the other sex in living arrangements, and to adjust aspects
of the physical training programs." '215 While it is far from obvious why
privacy is a requisite of formal equality," 6 requiring an adjustment in
physical standards is eminently defensible given "physiological differ-
ences between male and female individuals. To give women a parallel
"opportunity" without accounting for this difference is to give them no
opportunity at all.2
Indeed in some ways establishing VWIL, but with a rigorous, ad-
versative approach that nonetheless fell short of the physical standards
required for VMi, would have been a superior solution to simply open-
ing VMI to female admissions. If the Court were to apply the principles
announced in VMJ more consistently, it might have required this solu-
tion. The opinion itself recognizes that
[s]ex classifications may be used to compensate women for
"particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered," to
"promote equal employment opportunity," to advance full de-
velopment of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people.
But such classifications may not be used, as they once were, to
create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority
of women.1 9
It takes but a small leap of logic-calling a physical standard that
only men can reach a "sex classification"-to require a two-school solu-
tion. VMI's vision of formal equality does not preclude "affirmative
action"; it permits a recognition that group differences can justify dispa-
rate treatment of individuals so long as an exceedingly persuasive
justification underlies such treatment.220 Thus a formal equality model
215. VM, 518 U.S. at 550 n.19.
216. Cf. Dianne Avery, Institutional Myths, Historical Narratives and Social Science Evi-
dence: Reading the "Record" in the Virginia Military Institute Case, 5 S. CAL. Ruv. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 189 (1996). "Neither VMI nor Virginia has articulated a public
mission... to protect 'decency' between the sexes." Id. at 351.
217. VMI, 518 U.S. at 550 n.19 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000)).
218. Some commentators have argued persuasively that while the VMI Court recognized
physiological differences, it remained distressingly blind to equally potent social dif-
ferences. See Vojdik, supra note 24. I agree wholeheartedly, which emphasizes the
limits of this article's argument. I do not argue here for a new theory of the Equal
Protection Clause.
219. VMI, 515 U.S. at 533-34 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
220. See Christopher D. Totten, Constitutional Precommitments to Gender Affirmative
Action in the European Union, Germany, Canada, and the United States: A Compara-
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need not militate in favor of either fully open athletics21 -potentially to
the permanent detriment of female athletes 22 -- or athletics segregated
by regulations akin to the contact sports exemption,223 particularly when
athletic segregation itself limits the social standing of women.
Although perhaps, at first blush, sounding in an affirmative, sub-
stantive vision of the Equal Protection Clause,224 formal equality can
therefore be used to justify the following revision to the regulations re-
specting the establishment of separate teams for interscholastic athletics:
Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of para-
graph (a) of this section, a recipient must operate or sponsor
separate teams for members of each sex where sufficient inter-
est and ability exists to support such teams and where selection
for such teams is based upon athletic skill. However, where a
recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for
males, females must be allowed to try out for the team of-
fered.225
Five changes are proposed. First, there is no contact sports exemp-
tion. As I have argued, the exemption cannot persuasively be defended.
tive Approach, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 27, 56 n.176 (2003); Tokarz, supra note 23,
at 206.
221. See, e.g., Petrie v. 111. High Sch. Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855, 865-68 (I11. Ct. App. 1979)
(Craven, J., dissenting); M-ARTINE RoTHBmArr, THE APARTHEID OF SEX: A MANI-
FESTO ON THE FREEDOM OF GENDER 73-77 (1995); Tokarz, supra note 23, at 239.
222. But see FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 117, at 218-19 (suggesting that if the gap be-
tween highly skilled male and female athletes were to continue to dose at the present
rate, they would be substantially equal in thirty to forty years).
223. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Bd. ofEduc., 449 U.S. 1301 (1980).
224. See Robin West, The Meaning ofEqualiy and the Interpretive Turn, 66 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 451, 469 (1990).
225. For the sake of ready comparison, the current regulation reads as follows:
Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this
section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of
each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or
the activity involved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates
or sponsors a team in a particular sport for members of one sex but oper-
ates or sponsors no such team for members of the other sex, and athletic
opportunities for members of that sex have previously been limited, mem-
bers of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out for the team offered
unless the sport involved is a contact sport. For the purposes of this part,
contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, bas-
ketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of which involves
bodily contact.
34 C.F.t § 106.41(b) (2004).
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The one purpose that has been addressed and approved of as a matter of
equal protection-preventing the integration of contact sports-is
rather ably served by the competitive skill exemption.
Second, separate teams are required rather than optional where se-
lection for teams is based on athletic skill and sufficient interest and
ability exists to support two teams. A careful reading of the 1979 Policy
Interpretation suggests that this change simply cleans up the language of
the Regulation to reflect what is already required. Under the Regulation,
a recipient's selection of teams in contact sports must "effectively ac-
commodate" the interests and abilities of its students. 2 6 For contact
sports, "effective accommodation" means that a school may not offer
just one team if the excluded sex meets a threshold level of interest and
ability such that a viable team with a reasonable expectation of intercol-
legiate competition could be formed, and if opportunities for members
of that sex have historically been limited.227 I agree with HEW that is
not dear why, if both women and men are interested in playing a sport
and are able to play it-football, say-a school should be able to effec-
tively limit its offerings to men by having just one, skill-based team.
Such a rule raises the specter that has received the most attention in
discussions of Title IX: the perceived need to eliminate men's teams in
order to have the financial wherewithal to support women's teams.
While intelligent arguments abound on both sides of this debate,22 8 I
find it persuasive that the decision of which sports an institution receiv-
ing federal funding offers its students should not be made using a
criterion-skill level-that discriminates against women. 9 Although
the Supreme Court has not had to consider whether it is constitutional
226. 34 C.F.R. § 106 .4 1(c)(1) (2004).
227. See id. See also Application of the Policy-Determination of Athletic Interests and
Abilities, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,417, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979). For non-contact sports, a re-
cipient need only provide a separate team if the same two conditions are met along
with the additional condition that members of the excluded sex lack the skill to play
on an integrated team.
228. See generally College Sports Council, at http://www.savingsports.org (last visited Mar.
31, 2005) (arguing that Title IX's proportionality test is an effective quota that un-
duly harms men's programs such as wrestling); Women's Sports Foundation, at
http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2005) (arguing that
big-budget sports like football and men's basketball are more to blame than Tide IX
for squeezing out men's programs).
229. Although equally at odds with the purpose behind Title IX, discrimination based on
revenue does not likely qualify as intentional discrimination against women. Thus,
such discrimination might survive under the theory of equality animating the present
equal protection doctrine. Although discrimination based on skill is also, technically,
disparate impact, I am suggesting by implication that because the inevitability of the
connection between sex and skill is decisive enough to warrant judicial notice, skill-
based discrimination could qualify as intentional.
[Vol. 11:133
HANDS OFF POLICY
for public schools to constructively limit opportunities for female ath-
letes by providing just one team in a given sport, the VMI case suggests
the possibility that, at least if practiced on a broad enough scale, such
sub rosa discrimination is impermissible.23
Professor Deborah Brake has suggested a more radical change in
the regulation. She floats a proposal that would require a school to offer
a woman's team in a contact sport when just one female student re-
quests it, and then make an affirmative commitment to providing the
necessary resources to see if a women's team could be formed. 1 Profes-
sor Brake argues that this change would prevent the "interest and
ability" test from undermining Title IX's commitment to substantive
equality."2 Whatever the substantive merits of this proposal, it would
exacerbate the concern over traditional men's sports being displaced
even absent any groundswell of interest among campus females. More
important for the purposes of this Article, I do not find such a proposal
defensible as a matter of formal equality.
The third change I propose is to address directly the concern over
men's domination of women's sports by stating baldly that Title IX re-
quires that women be allowed to try out for men's sports.233 By
implication, Title IX does not require that men be allowed to try out for
women's sports. The redacted language, allowing schools to discriminate
in tryouts where opportunities for the excluded sex have not previously
been limited, is an unnecessary cover. If this qualifier would never pass
muster as an Equal Protection matter, it is perplexing that it is relied
upon in Title IX. As I have noted, the size of the skills gap between men
and women leads to a different presumption when a male competes in
an otherwise all-female sport than in the inverse case. The skills gap,
then, is the only justification that should be needed for any asymmetry




230. See Julia Lamber, Gender and Intercollegiate Athletics: Data and Myths, 34 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 151, 201 n.330 (2001).
231. Brake, supra note 23, at 140.
232. Seeid. at 139-40.
233. For a similar proposal, see Abigail Crouse, Comment, Equal Athletic Opportunity: An
Analysis of Mercer v. Duke University and a Proposal to Amend the Contact Sports Ex-
ception to Title IX, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1655, 1684 (2000).
234. Again, Professor Brake has proposed a different, more radical approach. She suggests
that the regulations allow men to play "women's" sports "where the denial of the
sport to males rests on cultural assumptions about the sport's femininity." Brake, su-
pra note 23, at 145. This solution, while interesting, strikes me as hopelessly
standardless. See George, supra note 211, at 1112 n.25 (finding it "difficult to visual-
ize ... athletic directors or NCAA administrators making such abstract decisions").
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Fourth, "athletic" skill rather than "competitive" skill is the trigger
for required sex segregation. The rationale for asymmetric discrimina-
tion I have offered does not allow discrimination based on disparate
mental or experiential skills. Reliable evidence suggesting any difference
in the intellectual capacities of males and females is at best hard to come
by, at worst apocryphal, and in any event far too controversial to be re-
lied upon either by a government agency or by courts."' Returning to
the all-female chess team discussed in Part II, a set of Title IX imple-
menting regulations fully attentive to current Equal Protection
jurisprudence would not allow such arbitrary segregation, justifiable
only on the basis of past discrimination. Of course, chess is not an ath-
letic activity and so does not fall under Section 106.41 of the
implementing regulations, but the analogy remains apt should a school
for whatever reason offer a "sport"-sailing or pool, perhaps236-for
which selection is not based on athletic skill. The regulations plainly
contemplate "athletic" activities in which selection is not based upon
competitive skill. Changing "competitive" to "athletic" merely covers
"competitive" activities not based on athletic skill, to whatever extent
such activities are offered in practice.
Finally, whether women are allowed to try out for a "men's" sport
does not depend on whether a women's team exists. If a woman is so
qualified, then she should be allowed to test her skills by competing
with and against men. Limiting such a woman to the all-women's team
places an artificial ceiling on her development. Justice Stevens' opinion
in O'Connor, allowing a school to refuse to permit a qualified girl from
trying out for a basketball team,237 is unacceptably anachronistic.
The present Regulations seem premised on the idea that the spirit
of Title IX must be followed without upsetting the status quo on ath-
letic fields. The idea that males must be free to exclude females from
contact sports is treated as the province of natural law, biological dogma
not to be upset by the laws of men. Moreover, the thinking seems to go,
a woman excluded from a team because she lacks the skills has but
learned the same lesson that male athletes learn all the time: Life doles
out ability with an uneven hand. Gender equity, however, means that
women may not be denied opportunities because they are women. Allow-
ing men to segregate sporting opportunities by sex-either formally
through a contact sports exemption or informally by basing membership
on competitive skill-risks such impermissible denial.
235. See ROTHBLAKr, supra note 221, at 49-51; FAtJSTO-STERLING, supra note 117, at 13-
60.
236. See Robinson, supra note 26, at 351.
237. O'Connor v. Bd. ofEduc. of Sch. Dist. 23, 449 U.S. 1301 (1980).
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It must be acknowledged that men who cannot try out for women's
teams are similarly being denied an opportunity because of sex. The dif-
ference is that when men try out for and make women's teams they are
simultaneously denying an opportunity to an otherwise qualified
woman. Depending on the size of sex-based differences, either the pre-
sumption that the man would not make the team but for his sex
advantage, or the less ambitious presumption that his sex makes him
better than he otherwise would be, is unavoidable. Either presumption
strikes me as an exceedingly persuasive reason to allow female-only, but
not male-only sports. When a school allows a woman to try out for a
men's team, it is only denying an opportunity to a man who lacks suffi-
cient skill, independent of sex. This brand of discrimination is
permissible, even welcomed, in the sports context. That men are, by and
large, better at sports than women is thus an argument for favoring
women in providing athletic opportunity. We may call it a species of
affirmative action, but it is in fact what simple equality requires.
CONCLUSION
Heather Mercer is still making headlines, in a way. Under the even-
tual disposition of her case, institutions regulated by Title IX cannot
discriminate on the basis of sex against a student granted a tryout. If the
sport is a contact sport, however, they need not allow the student to try
out in the first place. 238 Thus after Mercer, schools have a strong incen-
tive not to grant women tryouts for fear of being tied into anti-
discrimination laws once they do.
Mary Nystrom, a junior place kicker at Cooper High School in
Robinsdale, Minnesota, saw an advertisement in a local paper in spring
2003.239 The University of Minnesota was looking for a "quality
kicker/punter. ,21 Mary says she's comfortable kicking from thirty-five
yards, and her brother, Dan, is the Big Ten's career leader in field goals
made, so she decided to show up for tryouts. 24 ' Nystrom was rebuffed
because football "is not a co-ed sport."24 2 School officials mentioned the
Heather Mercer case to her when they denied her.
243
238. See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 647-48 (4th Cir. 1999).
239. Dennis Brackin, 'U" Says No to Nystrom: Football Team Denies Tryout to Female Place-
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Newspaper reports describing Nystrom's rejection dutifully men-
tioned that Title IX does not require schools to allow women to try out
for contact sports. 24' None mentioned that the University of Minnesota
is a public school, and thus beholden to the Equal Protection Clause.
Nystrom says she will not fight it.
24 5
Title IX's contact sports exemption thus affects both private and
public schools. It affects the way we think about the proper role of gen-
der equity in intercollegiate athletics. It casts in stone attitudes about
women that were at best fresh in 1975, at worst already stale by then.
One day, I suspect, Title IX will be in better harmony with the Consti-
tution. For Heather Mercer, Mary Nystrom, and those who may have
looked up to them, however, it will be too late. t
244. See id.; Associated Press, Kicker Told She Can't Try Out, CHi. TIaB., Apr. 19, 2003,
at 7.
245. Brackin, supra note 239.
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